INTRODUCTION
In Aldo Leopold's 'Land Ethic' essay, he claims that no significant change in ethics has ever been made without persons internally altering their 'intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions.' He further points out that ethically broadening the notion of community to include nonhuman nature was not something the conservation movement of his day was emphasising. This is evidenced, Leopold surmises, by the absence of conservation-talk in both philosophy and religion circles.
1 Much of his A Sand County Almanac, the work in which 'The Land Ethic' essay is found, seeks to persuade the conservationist, the philosopher, and the religionist that a more expansive notion of community is warranted. Intriguingly, Leopold appeals to multiple norms of which he assumes his readers are already familiar and presumably theretofore sympathetic. Additionally, Leopold likens the moral changes he advocates to the practice of conservation itself. Doing so implies that just as with sacrificial conservation practices, moral conflict that includes a land ethic will surely arise, and its resolution is neither neat nor easy. When these elements are kept in mind and interpreted correctly, a very different understanding of Leopold's ethics emerges than is typically proffered.
This essay argues that Leopold intellectually commits himself to value pluralism and to a consistency maximisation of values, entailing that both these elements need to be present within any understanding of a land ethic properly deemed Leopoldian. Such an understanding of Leopold's ethics stands in strong contrast to two of the most famous interpretations put forward by J. Baird Callicott. The paper unfolds by first explaining Callicott's two differing takes on Leopold, showing some of the severe difficulties attending them, difficulties that directly stem from not taking into account the rather radical pluralism and consistency maximisation strategies for which I will argue. This, in turn, allows for putting forward the beginnings of an original and more accurate account of Leopold, one centering on both pluralism and ethical decision procedures incorporating such pluralism.
Moreover, as will be seen, Leopold's reasons for doing so hearken to more than just a pragmatic pluralism, which has been a point of contention between another environmental philosopher, Bryan Norton, an advocate of Leopold embracing such pragmatism, and Callicott, who sees Leopold eschewing pragmatism. 2 My arguments imply that Leopold's investment in pluralism goes much deeper than their debate allows.
This depth of commitment by Leopold reveals itself pretty much through a straightforward reading of Leopold's ideas in light of a basic understanding of moral theory. However, Callicott's more entangled interpretations, the latter of which is still operative in his moral thinking-as evidenced by his latest book, Thinking Like a Planet:
The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic (2013)-very much set the terms for how Leopold's ideas would largely be received and how they are still understood today. It is to these seminal interpretations and to some conceptual disentangling that the paper now turns.
CALLICOTT'S PRIORITISATIONS OF THE LAND ETHIC
One ought not underestimate J. Baird Callicott's continuing scholarly importance.
His ideas are still a keystone for how many interpret Leopold. For example, Roberta L.
Millstein, in her own recent reexamination of Callicott's later take on Leopold, challenges Callicott's contention that Darwin's The Descent of Man had supreme influence over Leopold's ethical thinking. Though she argues Callicott's reading to be flawed, she admits it is now 'the canonical interpretation', influencing how many other philosophers come to understand Leopold's ideas. 3 Attesting to Callicott's even broader historical influence on environmental philosophy, Wayne Ouderkirk writes the following:
J. Baird Callicott has been, and continues to be, one of the central figures in the development of environmental philosophy. To say that he has helped set the terms of the discussion, that he has developed one of the central theoretical models in the field, the land ethic, and that his work has provoked reactions and reflections that have both clarified other models and opened new avenues for continued work is no exaggeration. Holland, 2016 . 6 Callicott 1995 , pp. 237-254. 7 Gary Varner 2003 , p. 196. 8 Callicott 1995 efforts to extend 'direct moral considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities' (i.e., Leopold urges that non-human nature is not simply a bundle of resources to be used instrumentally excluded entities and activities is part of 'ecological evolution'. Callicott thinks that the key thing to be taken away here is that ethics can be discussed in biological terms.
Furthermore, Leopold states that an ethic is 'a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence.' This last assertion, argues Callicott, 'unmistakably calls to mind Darwinian evolution as the conceptual context in which a biological account of the origin and development of ethics must ultimately be located.' So, because Leopold seems to define ethics and their extension naturalistically, and because he uses language 23 Callicott responds to the divisiveness of his views in two important pieces. Each takes advantage of his theoretical switch to a neo-Humean ethical worldview, both in general and with specific reference to interpreting Leopold. See Callicott 1989 and Callicott 1998 . 24 Callicott 1987. hearkening to evolutionary theory, his moral thinking must be substantially Darwinian. Taking cues from the moral sense theorists, Darwin surmises that morality originates in parental and filial affections, cultivating close-knit social groups amongst kin. These feelings might then attach themselves to extended family, enlarging the social group. But if such enlargement betters its members' life prospects (e.g., through better defense or better provisioning), this might increase the probability of passing down genes inclining such pro-social behaviors. 'Thus, the more diffuse familial affections, which 35 Callicott 1987, pp. 194-195. 36 Ibid., pp. 206-207. before environmental duties. The land ethic, then, is not draconian or fascist. 37 Callicott makes clear, however, that a land ethic, despite its location on the moral periphery, can still exert some influence on human behavior. Just as obligations to one's nation may come at the expense of his inner social circles (e.g., through paying taxes or serving in the military), so too nurturing the land's good may come at the expense of other, more typically privileged objects of one's moral concern. Callicott contends that
Leopold's understanding of ecology, which identified the land's health as contingent upon normal rates of species extinction and the general tendency of evolution to enrich the land biologically through speciation, informs our moral sensibilities (and thus a land ethic) that the land should at times be considered as more important than the individual good of one or more of its parts. 38 Hence, the moral good emerging from the land-ascommunity idea, a good arising from those characteristically enduring and evolving relationships amongst the community's constituent organisms, gives way to a series of behavioral constraints, which Callicott identifies as consistent with Leopold's thinking.
As if descending from a mountaintop visit with Leopold, Callicott proclaims: According to the land ethic, therefore: Thou shalt not extirpate or render species extinct; thou shalt exercise great caution in introducing exotic and domestic species into local ecosystems, in extracting energy from the soil and releasing it into the biota, and in damming or polluting water courses; Despite the common origin of all ethics, this naturalised explanation as to the origin of ethics-when framed against the background of Leopold's overall thoughtdoes not allow for a reduction of ethics to a single value scheme (e.g., Callicott's community memberships and the positive emotion-tickling humans ultimately will feel at the sight of well-functioning communities). Indeed, even when Leopold goes on to formally state his land ethic principle (which ties the morality of an action to its effects on the biotic community), the concern for environmental health underwriting this principle fits neither Callicott's early interpretation of ethical monolith nor his later, still privileged interpretation of it as a largely marginal consideration born of expanding sentiment. Rather, established ethics are made more complex by the addition of a new, important, holistic moral consideration-the objectively identifiable health of the land, be it analogised as organism-like or more akin to community health. 46 Present in Leopold's writings, I will now show, is both recognition of this complexity in moral life and an emphasis on behavior respectful of a full variety of moral value in the world, the kind of variety his intended audience would recognise and to which Leopold himself commits.
To get at Leopold's pluralism, consider, for example, Leopold's contention that something very special arises regarding the moral status of us humans when we act in a morally correct manner. The following provocative quotation was written and publicly presented, according to Leopold's biographer, Curt Meine, just some sixteen months 46 Elsewhere I argue that Leopold's valuational commitment to 'health' can be seen as underwriting ascriptions of intrinsic value to both biotic wholes and individual organisms; see Dixon 2016. prior to Leopold organising his 'Land Ethic' essay, 47 Moral agency, correctly exercised, is an ability that lifts humans above the constituents of nonhuman nature, or so Leopold thinks here. 49 Realising the horror of anthropogenic extinction, and internalising it such that we mourn the loss, is an exercise of this capacity. Its use speaks well for us humans, albeit a bit ironically here, it must be admitted, given our role in the passenger pigeon's demise. Leopold implies that other organisms cannot realise either the concept or the magnitude of our world losing another species. We humans can and should (and have, at least some of us). The reason for this advanced status is a capability that comes from being rational enough to be this moral; it is not a judgment about an advanced moral status derivable from evolutionary-ordered, 47 Meine explains that Leopold made the remarks that follow, and which would end up in A Sand County Almanac under the subsection 'On a Monument to the Pigeon', on April 6, 1946 (Meine, p., 482) . Leopold began organising the material that became 'The Land Ethic' essay in July 1947 (Meine, p., 501) . 48 Leopold, A Sand County Almanac p., 110 49 Even if, as Callicott argues, one should tie Leopold's ideas substantially to Darwin's own, there are ideas within the latter's writings regarding 'conscience' and the related idea of moral agency that can be used to carve-out a unique dignity for humans, one that I argue is contingent upon respect for nonhuman constituents of the environment and which is different that what Callicott's interpretation of Darwin allows; see Dixon 2007. community membership simpliciter, as Callicott must maintain. Indeed, emphasising a special moral status for humans based on our ability to be moral, or perhaps better put, based on our ability to be moral in a particular way, is more reminiscent of the Kantian ethical tradition rather than the Humean/Smithean, moral sense one.
Careful readers of Leopold also realise that he assigns moral import not only to the biotic community via the 'Land Ethic', and to human moral agency, as illustrated above, but also to the individual character of humans. Of course, the idea that character ought to be seen as morally significant is, as Callicott notes in his earlier interpretation of It [conservation] expects subsidies to do more-and the private owner to do less-for the community than they are capable of doing. We rationalise these defects as individualism, but they imply no real respect for the landowner as an individual. They merely condone the ecological ignorance which contrasts so strongly with his precocity in mechanical things. The last three quotations from Leopold carry two implications for present consideration: First, they evidence Leopold's commitment to the idea that persons ought to be ethically respected as individuals having certain capacities, not just as entities deriving moral value from community membership alone (this idea was also true with the above point about moral agency); second, they clarify a virtue that self-aware human beings should cultivate as a ground of self-respect, namely, right-minded ecological thinking. That a concern for self-respect is an appropriate motivator-and indeed that it 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.
is preferable, in ways, to external motivators-demonstrates Leopold's commitment to the notion that something like virtue is to be valued in itself. Thus, we see Leopold's commitment to yet another value besides land holism, the life of the self-respecting, virtuous individual.
Further textual evidence against the idea that Leopold's moral views are exclusively concerned with community membership can be found both in the passage just prior to Leopold's articulation of the land ethic principle in A Sand County Almanac and in that passage directly following it. First, regarding that which precedes the land ethic principle, Leopold writes: 'The "key-log" which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as The truth is that Leopold makes an identity claim that logically commits him to viewing expediency or utility as ethical. Moreover, recall the earlier quotation of
Leopold's to which special attention was drawn. Leopold wrote: 'Politics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content.' 56 Leopold flat-out states here that economics help replace free-for-all competition and is an advanced symbioses, a co-operative mechanism by virtue of its having ethical content, politics too. The shrinkage in the flora is due to a combination of clean-farming, woodlot grazing, and good roads. Each of these necessary changes of course requires a larger reduction in the acreage available for wild plants, but none of them requires, or benefits by, the erasure of species from whole farms, townships, or counties. There are idle spots on every farm, and every highway is bordered by an idle strip as long as it is; keep cow, plow, and mower out of these idle spots, and the full native flora, plus dozens of interesting stowaways from foreign parts, could be part of the normal environment of every citizen.
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Here, then, is an example of conflict negotiation where Leopold clearly sees a way to respect multiple things of moral value. Leopold indicates that farming, grazing, road construction, and the concomitant reduction of land available for wild plants are a necessary means to some human goods (e.g., the moral goods represented by increases in utility for the farmer). He does not think that realising these goods must lead to 62 Leopold, 'The Farmer as Conservationist ', p., 238 quoted. in Curt Meine 1988 , p. 388. 63 Leopold 1949 eliminating the plant species from changing landscapes. Border spaces, which farmers already value for reducing erosion from their fields, become spaces specifically reserved for plant species deliberately removed from fields, for example. Leopold's general point is that human goods brought about by some industry need not conflict invariably with the goods represented by the flourishing of nature.
Although Leopold's suggestions as to where plants can find suitable habitat were ecologically creative, his method of conflict resolution in the above example is, from a philosophical point-of-view, rather ordinary. Leopold's strategy acknowledges the goods brought about by humans modifying the land while searching for a way to eliminate any resulting harm to certain values instantiated by the land: he suggests building roads such that they do not come at the expense of species of flora and the ecosystems to which they contribute. A more formal way of stating this conflict-resolution strategy is:
If there is some method X of realising value Φ such that X causes a reduction in another value Ψ, one ought to search for an alternative method Y that realises Φ without also causing a reduction in any other Ψ. If there is some method X of realising value Φ such that X causes a reduction in another value Ψ, and there is no other alternative method Y that realises Φ without also causing a reduction in any other Ψ, then X should be pursued in such a way as to better the possibilities for future, less conflict causing realisations of both Φ and Ψ.
Let us call this conflict negotiating strategy of Leopold's the Long Term
Dissolving Strategy. A consistent theme in Leopold's conservation thinking, then, is the rightness of humans dissolving value conflict, whether through creative solutions that dissolve the conflict with no sacrifice of value (i.e., through the Basic Dissolving Strategy) or through a more protracted strategy that betters the position for future value realisations, which reduce the conflict amongst those values hitherto at odds (i.e., through 70 Leopold 1949, pp. 224-225. exclusively privileging biotic wholes, and then later he backs away from this, arguing CO, February 18-21, 2014 . Their feedback on material presented there, much of which made its way into this paper, was also of great help.
